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Time and Consciousness:
A Phenomenological View
By Robert Osborne

Q

uestions regarding the nature of time abound in Western philosophy. By asking them, we seek to clarify our
knowledge and intuitions about an important aspect of
our conscious experience. In this paper, I will critique
Sydney Shoemaker‘s well-known argument for the objective and
empirical nature of time in order to show that time is instead
phenomenologically ideal, that is, that time is generated, and its
reality constituted, by a certain mode of our conscious, subjective
experience.
I. The Problem of Time
We often ask ―Does time exist?‖ or ―Is time real?‖ This
question is certainly worth asking, but requires a fair bit of clarification. What do we mean by exist and real? When we pose the
question ―Does time exist?‖ what are we really asking? Without
clarification, the question can on its face seem absurd—of course
time exists. We use it to measure the movements of the celestial
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bodies; we depend on it to organize our days and get to places
when we need to be there; we age and use it to keep track of that
aging. Furthermore, we all have the vivid subjective experience
of time—of earlier and later, and of past, present, and future. So
it seems clear from this evidence that time does exist. But a coherent question about the existence of time surely mustn‘t ignore
all these instances, so we must take the question to be getting at
something else.1 The question then must become ―Does time exist as something more than, and outside of, our subjective experience of it?‖ That is, are objects, events, and beings really in time;
is temporality an objective, inherent property of reality?
There have been numerous responses to this question in
the history of philosophy, including many contemporary ones.
In his famous essay ―The Unreality of Time,‖ J.M.E. McTaggart
argues that time does not exist, indeed cannot exist as we, as
Western thinkers, have often conceived it. However, it is important to note that McTaggart only argues for the conceptual incoherence of time—he is not claiming that our subjective experience
of time does not exist, only that ―[w]henever we perceive anything in time—which is the only way in which, in our present
experience, we do perceive things—we are perceiving it more or
less as it really is not.‖2 This is a rather explicitly Kantian view, it
seems, supposing that time is a necessary aspect of our experience, but that it does not apply to things as they really are in
themselves. But it is important to recognize, as is obvious, that
even if we take McTaggart to have proven the conceptual nonexistence of time (as I do), we continue to have temporally ordered experiences. Despite the apparent logical dismissal of
time, our subjective experience of it does not simply cease.3 The
dynamics of this subjective experience, and what it tells us about
the deeper nature of time, is what I will concern myself with in
this paper.
II. Change Without Time
I will now consider Shoemaker‘s account of time. In his
paper ―Time Without Change,‖ Shoemaker argues for the con-
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cept of ―empty time,‖ claiming that the existence of ―changeless
intervals‖ could be an empirically verifiable phenomenon. This
is an important instance where time is thought to be an objective
phenomenon, and its ―reality‖ is taken to depend on its having
some external manifestation beyond our minds or subjective experience.
First, let us examine Shoemaker‘s thought experiment
and his argument for the possibility of changeless intervals.
Shoemaker asks us to imagine a world, quite different from our
own, which is divided into three regions: A, B, and C. Inhabitants of the world are able to pass between the regions and can
observe much of what is occurring in a neighboring region.
However, periodically there occurs a ―local freeze‖ in one of the
regions, during which all processes and activity in that region
cease entirely. The inhabitants of the other, non-frozen regions
are able to observe a frozen region as such, but they are unable to
pass into it. Shoemaker then asks us to imagine that the inhabitants of the world discover through the use of clocks in the unfrozen regions that the local freezes always last the same amount
of time, namely one year. Additionally, through further measurement they discover that the freezes occur at regular intervals—every third year in region A, every fourth year in region B,
and every fifth year in region C. And here we come to the crux
of Shoemaker‘s argument: with these intervals in mind, the inhabitants are able to induce that every sixtieth year there will occur a ―total freeze,‖ in which all three regions will simultaneously
be frozen for a year. And since the inhabitants of each region
have observed freezes in the other regions, Shoemaker believes
that they would have good reason to think that this total freeze
does indeed occur. He admits that one could argue that, since no
one would ever observe a total freeze, the freeze every sixtieth
year is simply skipped and does not occur. However, in an appeal to Occam‘s Razor, Shoemaker prefers his simpler theory,
which supposes the occurrence of a total freeze, to the more complex explanation for the anomalous non-occurrence of a total
freeze. Shoemaker then employs a modified theory of causality,
―action at a temporal distance,‖ to explain how his total freezes
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begin and end, arguing that the very passage of time itself could
have causal efficacy.4 He thinks that these total freezes give us
reason to believe in the existence of changeless intervals, and
therefore in the empirical and objective nature of time.
Whether the concept of changeless intervals has any empirical content or is nonsensical depends largely on whether we
conceptualize time as objective or subjective. The very fact that
Shoemaker thinks that changeless intervals can occur reveals that
he considers time to be an objective phenomenon. However,
there is a problem with this conception. Consider that time is
measured through change: the ticking of the hands of a clock, the
movement of the sun, the decay of an atomic element, even the
flow of our own thoughts. Change makes time intelligible. But
then, how is time without change possible? I argue that it isn‘t.
Shoemaker‘s term ―changeless interval‖ refers to a discrete, measurable period of time that has a specific beginning and end. And
yet, though the beginning of such an interval would have to be
preceded by a change, Shoemaker gives the passage of time itself
the power to effect change by ending the interval. Shoemaker
here is conflating ―change‖ and ―passage of time‖; he is giving
the ―passage of time‖ the causal efficacy of ―change.‖ In this
way, the passage of time becomes change—time has not escaped
change. The only reason it may seem otherwise in Shoemaker‘s
account is that his world functions in a manner radically different from our own. So, without change, the concept of a discrete
―changeless‖ interval becomes unintelligible, and therefore unverifiable. His three zones make it conveniently possible for unfrozen inhabitants to verify a changeless interval occurring in
another zone: there is still change to measure time outside the
changeless zone. But given that our world does not have zones,
and therefore only the occurrence of a total freeze is conceivably
possible for us, changeless intervals must be devoid of empirical
content. From this we can see that Shoemaker‘s argument tells
us nothing about the nature of our own world or the concepts
concerning it.
Now, consider that we start with the other possible assumption, namely that time is subjective, and non-empirical.
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Consider Kant‘s characterization of time as an a priori ‗pure intuition‘ of the mind, transcendentally prior to experience, allowing
us to have that experience at all, and through it, to make sense of
the world.5 I assert that this conception of time is more plausible
than an objectivist view, since the only real knowledge or evidence we can have about time is our own subjective, intuitive
experience of it. It is important to note that, on the subjectivist
view, time has no objective manifestation. Indeed, it does not
follow from the propositions that change is objective, and that
change is a reference point in the (subjective) measurement of
time, that time too is objective. Were one to attribute objectivity to
time on the basis of these premises, he or she would succumb to
what Kant called the Transcendental Illusion: ―And this [the transcendental illusion] leads us to regard the subjective necessity of
a certain connection of our concepts for the benefit of the understanding as an objective necessity in the determination of things
in themselves.‖6 Kant here is emphasizing that necessary forms
of epistemology do not reflect necessary forms of ontology: just
because X is necessarily understood as Y does not necessarily
mean that X is Y. On this formulation, just because time is,
through its empirical measurement, necessarily understood as objective does not necessarily mean that time is objective. So, under
this conception, time would exist inside the mind of the conscious observer, not as a quality or property of the external
world. If we subject this theory to Occam‘s Razor, as Shoemaker
did with his theory concerning the total freeze, we find that it is
preferable to an objectivist account, as it posits only one entity,
subjective time, as opposed to two: objective time and our subjective experience of it. So, we can see from this view that if change
were to stop, time would cease as well, since the change in our
mental states and our representations, i.e., the ―succession of appearances,‖7 is what the pure intuition of time is arranging and
apprehending.8 With change gone and nothing to apprehend,
the pure intuition of time would be empty, and our subjective
experience of time would cease.
But now let us consider a thought-experiment counter to
Shoemaker‘s. Imagine a world metaphysically no different from
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our own, but a world in which every person has mastered the art
of meditation. These people have all been brought up in the art
of contemplative practice, and are so adept at its use that they
have the ability to completely stop the flow of their rational,
thinking mental states.9 This can be achieved in many ways,
such as by focusing on one‘s breathing, which would assist in the
gradual emptying of one‘s mind. So, let us imagine then that
there is a global festival held on this world every year, during
which all the inhabitants enter into a meditative state at the same
time, lasting for an agreed-upon interval of change, measured by
(the ticking of) a clock. Once in this state, each individual is able
to still the intentional functioning of his or her mind. Each
would then experience a pure, objectless consciousness.10 In this
state, the pure intuition of time would cease to apprehend any
successions, for there would be no objects, internal or external, to
represent. And with the cessation of the intuition‘s operation,
the subjective experience of time would fade and eventually disappear.11 With every inhabitant of this world in an objectless
conscious state simultaneously, the intersubjective experience of
temporality would vanish, and time would effectively stop. 12
And yet, outside the stilled minds of the populace, change would
continue. Rivers would continue to flow, clouds would form
and disperse, plants would photosynthesize, and the hearts of
the meditating inhabitants would continue to beat. And yet all
this would occur outside of time. Change without time.
But how is awareness, i.e., evidence, of an objectless conscious state possible without time or intentionality as a frame of
reference? That is, how are the meditators to verify, upon reflection, that they did indeed experience an a-temporal state, during
which change nevertheless continued? We may look to consciousness considerations within the study of the philosophy of
mind to address these questions. In his book Mysticism, Mind,
Consciousness, Robert K. C. Forman examines the nature of what
he calls the pure consciousness event (PCE).13 He argues from his
theory of knowledge-by-identity that such an objectless conscious
state as the PCE is an instance of non-intentional experience.
Knowledge-by-identity is formed when the subject knows some-
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thing by virtue of being it.14 When one is in contact with one‘s
own consciousness, the subject is not distinct from the object:
pure consciousness experiences itself—subject and object collapse
in on one another. As such, knowledge-by-identity is a reflexive
or self-referential form of knowing.15 Forman underlines the sui
generis nature of knowledge-by-identity:
To assume that we know our own consciousness in the
same way we know another person, an apple, or even
facets of our own personality would be to commit the
fallacy of the displaced object. Our familiarity with our
own consciousness is so intimate, so without seams, that
we have no way of teasing out its constituent parts. In
knowing it we just have an immediate sense of it and of
its continuity through what we know (intellectually) as
past and present.16 This intimate acquaintance— what I
have called ―knowledge-by-identity‖—should be distinguished in epistemological structure from all other
knowledge.17
As my thought-experiment shows, the mind‘s ability to alter its
own conscious states would allow the meditating inhabitants to
experience an objectless state of which they could be fully aware.
The awareness that a consciousness has of itself is not temporally
constructed; ―[r]ather, awareness per se simply ties past and present together as one single continuous awareness. That is, being
aware transcends time.‖18 The concept of time without change as
presented by Shoemaker falls short in both its objective and subjective interpretations, and his thought-experiment fails through
incommensurability. Nevertheless, Shoemaker was correct in
suggesting that time and change are not necessarily coextensive.
Through a reexamination of the concepts of ―time‖ and
―change,‖ and their relation to pure consciousness, it seems clear
that what is possible is not time without change, but rather
change without time.
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III. Conclusion
I have endeavored to show that time is phenomenologically ideal. From my examination of Shoemaker‘s argument, we
can see that time is not a typical empirical concept, and that it is
unintelligible without change. And through my thought experiment, it has been shown that change without time is possible, due to the nature of pure consciousness. From this, it can be
concluded that time is not an independently existing entity or
feature of the external world, but rather a phenomenological artifact arising from a particular mode of subjective experience.
Time is a function of rational consciousness. It may be argued,
contra this line of reasoning, that time could still be an objective
feature of the world, that when we alter our consciousness and
cease the apprehension of successions, we are simply cutting
ourselves off from observing the time inherent in the world (and
that this is why our experience of time stops). It may be replied
that the fact that we continue to have an experience of time when
we close our eyes means that time is not something inherent in
the external world, and that the flow of our mental states constitutes a succession that gives rise to subjective time.19 Furthermore, the observation that the subjective experience of time
ceases altogether when we remove the succession of our mental
states shows that time is not something inherent in the mental
world, since we are always observing our own consciousness,
though not always as a succession. Rather, time emerges from a
certain mode of experience, one where things are experienced in a
certain way (as successions), and therefore as being a certain way,
namely temporal. And as such, in response to our orienting
question, time arises from the form of one type of our subjective
experience, and it does not exist as something more than or outside of it. Time is not a thing to be experienced, but rather a way
of experiencing things.
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Notes
1. This may seem entirely obvious, but it is of prime importance
in philosophy to clarify what it is we are discussing. I do not
doubt that much time and effort has been wasted in debate due
to the failure to recognize this distinction.
2. J.M.E. McTaggart, ―The Unreality of Time,‖ in The Philosophy of
Time, eds. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, Oxford
Readings in Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
1993), 34.
3. This may suggest that we are at least not purely rational beings,
and that experience is not subject to all the vagaries of reason.
4. Sydney Shoemaker, ―Time Without Change,‖ in The Philosophy
of Time, eds. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, Oxford
Readings in Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
1993), 75-76.
5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Marcus
Weigelt (1781; London: Penguin Books, 2007), A 31 = B 46.
6. Ibid., A 297 = B 353.
7. Ibid., A 31 = B 46.
8. I would like, here, to note that the pure intuition of time is importantly prior to the experience of change and succession, and so
does not arise from it, but rather makes it possible as such. I do
not claim that the pure intuition itself would cease to be altogether; I only suggest that without the content supplied by the
apprehension of change and succession, the pure intuition of
time would be empty and our subjective intuitive experience of
time would cease.
9. This proposition is really not so unbelievable, certainly not as
fantastical as Shoemaker‘s thought experiment. Hundreds of
millions of people have been making contemplative practice a
foundational aspect of their worldview for millennia. That the
mind is capable of acts and states far different from the everyday
discursive thinking mode is certain, and the expansion of this
ability has been the basis for religious and mystical beliefs for
longer than Western civilization has existed. The naïve belief
that the ―I‖ and consciousness ceases to be when rational
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thought stops surely descends from outdated Cartesian rationalism. Indeed, people far less proficient in meditation than Zen
masters and Yogis are able to reach such a state. I myself have
experienced it, if only for a few moments. I have experienced
meditation periods of half an hour that have seemed to pass in
five minutes. We can think of this, in Kantian terms, as the pure
intuition of time breaking down in the absence of thoughts and
objects to represent as successions.
10. This opposes the well-known views of Brentano and Husserl,
and the popular view in contemporary analytic philosophy of
mind, that all conscious mental states are necessarily directed at
an object (the intentional object).
11. See n. 7.
12. Let us imagine, for the sake of the thought-experiment, that
there are no animals or any other sentient creatures on the planet
for whose subjective experience of time we must account.
13. Robert K. C. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1999), 59. Forman is retired
Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Hunter College and
founder of the peer-reviewed Journal of Consciousness Studies.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Parentheses Forman‘s.
17. Forman, 127.
18. Ibid., 122.
19. It is also important to consider the fact that there are meditative states of altered consciousness in which the individual continues to move and observe the external world visually, but is so
adept at controlling their mental state that they also have no subjective experience of time. Those capable of such states are considerably rare, but they likewise demonstrate that time cannot be
an objective feature of the external world.
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